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CLEARLY AMORPHOUS: FINDING A PARTICULAR 
SOCIAL GROUP FOR CHILDREN RESISTING GANG 
RECRUITMENT 
Adreanna Orlang+ 
The applicant, a minor, fears that he will be harmed or killed by 
gang members on account  of his membership in a particular social 
group: young men in Guatemala who resist gang recruitment.  When 
the applicant was eleven years old, members of gang XXX began 
heavily recruiting in the applicant’s town.  Gang members told the 
applicant and other young boys in the neighborhood that if they 
refused to join gang XXX, they and their families would be killed.  
The first time he refused to join gang XXX, five gang members beat 
the applicant and left him bleeding.  Gang members followed the 
applicant around his town daily, hitting the applicant with sticks and 
knives when he tried to hide from them.  Once, gang members sliced 
the back of the applicant’s neck with a machete.  The applicant 
relocated to another town to escape the harm, but when the gang 
found out that he had relocated, the gang told the rest of his family 
that they would be exterminated if the applicant did not join their 
ranks.  To demonstrate the seriousness of their threats, gang 
members shot the applicant’s grandmother in the head.1  
                                                 
 + J.D./M.A. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of 
Law; B.A., 2006, High Point University.  The author would like to thank, Juan Fogelbach, 
Christina Kube, and Charles “Locky” Nimick for their constant guidance and support during the 
writing process.  The author would also like to express her gratitude to her parents and her 
brother, three of the most inspiring individuals she knows.  Finally, this Note is dedicated to the 
author’s baby sister, Rachel, in anticipation that life will also take her to wonderful places. 
 1. This narrative, though completely fabricated, resembles a typical asylum claim based on 
resisting gang recruitment.  See, e.g., Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 2011) (“He 
claimed his resistance to gang recruitment would inspire manipulation, extortion, and even death 
threats from gang members.”); Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1135 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(“[G]ang members broke into [the applicant’s] home, pointed guns at [her] family members, and 
took [the applicant’s grandson] with them.  They told [the grandson] that they would rape his 
sister if he did not join.”); Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(describing how gang members threatened to kill the applicant and the applicant’s family, and 
then attacked the applicant’s father after the applicant refused to give the gang money or join the 
gang); Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing the applicant’s testimony, 
stating “[t]he gang members wanted [him] to join the gang but he refused [and] [a]s a  
result . . . [o]n one occasion, they cut his neck with a switchblade”); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 
580 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[G]ang members warned . . . that the brothers must join the gang or else their 
bodies might end up in a dumpster . . . . [T]he respondents . . . learned that the [gang] shot and 
killed a young boy in the neighborhood after he refused to join the gang.”). 
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Political asylum is protection offered by a sovereign authority to a person 
who is no longer safe in his or her home country.2  An alien applying for 
asylum in the United States must prove that he or she is a refugee within the 
statutory meaning of the term.3  This includes showing that he or she has 
suffered persecution or has a “well-founded fear of persecution,” either of 
which must be “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”4  Additionally, the alien must 
prove that he or she is unwilling or unable to seek protection from his or her 
home country.5  Persecution based on religion, nationality, race, and political 
opinion is usually easy to recognize.6  However, those individuals whose 
reasons for seeking asylum do not fit neatly into one of these four categories 
may attempt to fit their claim into a fifth category—membership in a particular 
social group (PSG).7 
                                                 
 2. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987); 
see also Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 235 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Cardoza-Fonesca, 
480 U.S. 421.  The act of granting asylum is almost as old as recorded civilization, with the 
earliest references to asylum being made more than 3500 years ago in the early empires of the 
Middle East.  See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, PROTECTING REFUGEES & 
THE ROLE OF UNHCR 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/4034b6a34.pdf. 
 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 4. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  These categories of persecution are commonly referred to as the 
five “protected grounds” of asylum.  See, e.g., Jiang v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he evidence . . . did not rise to the level needed to show a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of a protected ground.”).  The statute places the burden on the applicant to 
prove that one of the protected grounds is a central reason for the persecution.  8 U.S.C.  
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 5. 8 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(42)(A).  In 2009, the United States granted 22,119 individuals 
asylum.  OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 43 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary 
/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf. 
 6. See, e.g., Jiang, 474 F.3d at 26 (explaining that the applicant’s asylum claim was based 
on his fear of religious persecution after helping a Catholic priest avoid arrest for illegally 
practicing his faith); Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 545–47 (7th Cir. 2006) (describing the 
applicant’s claimed persecution as premised on nationality because the applicant faced 
persecution by the Eritrean government on account of her partial Ethiopian ancestry); Sulaman v. 
U.S. Attorney Gen., 147 F. App’x 872, 874–75 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (explaining the 
applicant’s asylum claim was premised on fear of racial perseuction by black South Africans 
because the applicant and his family are of Indian descent and “[s]ince the end of apartheid, 
Indians were discriminated against by blacks”); N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 314–15 (B.I.A. 
1998) (explaining the applicant’s original asylum claim was based on persecution for political 
opinion because the communist-backed Afghan government beat the applicant and detained him 
for one month after the applicant distributed anti-communist flyers). 
 7. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 219 n.5, 232 (explaining that the category of 
“membership in a particular social group” was added as an afterthought to the U.N. convention 
relating to the Statute of Refugees, from which Congress adopted its definition of “refugee”; it 
may have been added to capture claims that do not fall squarely into one of the other categories); 
see also infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.  However, this category is not unlimited and is 
not to be mistaken for a safety net.  See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (finding 
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Since the Central American civil wars of the 1980s, street gangs known as 
maras have established a foothold in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras.8  Central American countries offer gangs a fertile breeding 
ground as many Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran communities, still 
reeling from the devastation created by the civil wars,9  suffer from widespread 
poverty, flawed social infrastructures, and pervasive violence.10 
These gangs, largely composed of young men who have been marginalized 
by social and economic problems,11 obtain control of urban territories through 
                                                                                                                 
that boundaries on the definition of PSGs are necessary because the term is not meant to be a 
“catchall” for claims that do not fit perfectly into the other categories). 
 8. Connie McGuire, Wash. Office of Latin Am., Why a Resource Manual on Central 
American Gangs?, in CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG-RELATED ASYLUM: A RESOURCE GUIDE 1, 1 
(2008); Oliver Jütersonke et al., Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central 
America, 40 SECURITY DIALOGUE 373, 378–80 (2009) (explaining the history of maras in El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and comparing the transnational maras to the more localized 
youth groups known as pandillas); id. at 376 (“Although gangs . . . have long featured in Central 
American societies, their growth and influence over the past two decades is unprecedented.”); see 
also BEATRIZ  MANZ, WRITENET, CENTRAL AMERICA (GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, 
HONDURAS, NICARAGUA): PATTERNS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 25 (2008) (reporting that 
in Honduras, 500 per 100,000 people are members of gangs; in Guatemala, the number is 111 per 
100,000; and in El Salvador, the number is 152 per 100,000 (citing Mark A. Cohen & Mauricio 
Rubio, Solutions Paper: Violence and Crime in Latin America 9–10 & fig.14 (June 2007) (final 
version published in LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES COST AND BENEFITS (Bjorn 
Lombard, ed. 2000)))); CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34112, GANGS IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA 5 (2011) (estimating that approximately 70,000 gang members (not limited 
to maras) live in Central America, with the most severe activity occurring in El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala). 
 9. In El Salvador, for example, the left and right wings of the government fought a civil 
war beginning in 1980, in which guerilla and national forces clashed.  Juan J. Fogelbach, 
Comment, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Ley Anti Mara: El Salvador’s Struggle to Reclaim 
Social Order, 7 SAN DIEGO INTL. L. J. 223, 226–27 (2005).  Over a period of twelve years, 
75,000 people perished and the youth were left troubled with memories of grenade blasts and 
massacres.  Id. at 227.  Many Salvadorians left the country to escape the violence.  Id.  The death 
toll, combined with the relocation movement, decimated Salvadorian family structures.  Id. 
 10. See id. at 252 (describing that years of war have left Central America with “broken 
family structures, violent childhoods, abject poverty, and [a] large black market of left over war 
caliber weapons that allow [gangs] to flourish”); see also MANZ, supra note 8, at 4 (“[T]he 
economic devastation caused by these internal wars . . . and the inability of governments to invest 
in infrastructure and human capital have contributed to increased gang membership and crime.” 
(footnote omitted)); United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidance Note on Refugee 
Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs, ¶¶ 10–11 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Guidance 
Note on Refugee Claims], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bb21fa02.html 
(stating that street-gang activity is most prevalent in areas that suffer from poverty and weak rule 
of law, among other things).  Central America has “the highest male youth homicide rates in the 
world.”  Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 378 n.8 (citing PAULO SÉRGIO PINHEIRO, UNITED 
NATIONS, WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 357 (2006)).  In 2004, the annual 
homicide rate in Central America was over four times the global homicide rate.  Id. at 374–75. 
 11. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the 
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intimidation and fear.12   Gang activities range from minor crimes such as 
vandalism, petty theft, robbery, and assault, to serious offenses such as drug 
trafficking, extortion, murder and other crimes of violence.13  In  
gang-controlled areas,14 local residents live with gang violence on a daily 
basis.15 
To maintain their numbers and influence over an area, gangs force poor and 
socially marginalized young people to join their ranks.16  Gang members view 
resisting recruitment as a sign of disrespect; thus, resistance often induces the 
gang to retaliate violently against individuals who refuse gang association.17  
Gangs do not limit retaliation to the individuals being recruited; to coerce 
individuals into joining, gang members will also frequently threaten the 
resistor’s family members.18  However, even those youths who have only weak 
family ties are still susceptible to recruitment because they lack parental 
guidance.19   
                                                                                                                 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—El Salvador, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/SLV/CO/2 (June 27, 2007). 
 12. Jeffrey D. Corsetti, Note, Marked for Death: The Maras of Central America and Those 
Who Flee Their Wrath, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 409–10 (2006) (explaining that gangs maintain 
their power over an area because of widespread membership, government corruption, access to 
sophisticated weaponry, and willingness to exercise force).  When exerting their control, gangs 
often extort neighborhood residents, local businesses, and public transportation.  MANZ, supra 
note 8, at 4.  Gangs demand money from these local entities to secure “protection,” implying that 
the gangs will not hurt them if they pay.  Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 234; see also SEELKE, supra 
note 8, at 6 (explaining that failure to pay extortion demands usually results in violent retaliation).  
For example, in Guatemala, gang leaders demand from bus companies as much as $25 per bus 
each week, totalling nearly $5000 per week.  INT’L CRISIS GRP., GUATEMALA: SQUEEZED 
BETWEEN CRIME AND IMPUNITY 13–14 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld 
/docid/4c2847a72.html.  If the sums are not paid, the bus drivers are killed.  Id. at 14. 
 13. SEELKE, supra note 8, at 4. 
 14. Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 246 (“Turf is commonly established by graffiti on zones of 
influence—areas where crime is primarily committed by members of one gang.”).  According to 
one commentator, gangs commonly take over “slums and shantytowns,” which are left 
unprotected by public security. Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 4. 
 15. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, at ¶¶ 1, 8. 
 16. Id. ¶ 7; see also S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (B.I.A. 2008) (stating the immigration 
judge believed the applicants’ harm resulted from the gang’s desire to recruit the applicants as 
opposed to persecution on account of membership in a PSG or a certain political opinion). 
 17. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 6. 
 18. See, e.g., Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing how a 
gang threatened to kill the applicant or a member of his family if the applicant tried to flee the 
country a second time to escape the gang); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 579–80 (describing how the 
gang threatned to rape a female family member if the two male applicants did not join the gang). 
 19. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 36. In Guatemala, where 111 of 
every 100,000 people are gang members, civil war and its aftereffects have left many children 
orphaned.  Street Children—Guatemala, TOYBOX, http://www.toybox.org.uk/street-children 
/where-we-work/guatemala.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).  Those not orphaned may still be 
abandoned because their parents are impoverished. Id.  Between 2008 and 2009, one child was 
abandoned in Guatemala every four days.  Id.  Additionally, two-thirds of Guatemalan children 
live in poverty, making them likely targets for gang recruitment.  Id. 
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Once a gang targets an individual, the threat of severe harm often remains 
constant and unwavering until the youth acquiesces to recruitment.20 
Children who oppose gang recruitment find little relief from retaliation.  
Relocation within the same country does not guarantee protection because 
many gangs have nationwide influence,21 which Central American 
governments have been unable to forestall.22  To escape persecution, an 
increasing number of children who resist gang recruitment in Central America 
seek security elsewhere, commonly applying for asylum in the United States.23  
However, in the majority of these cases, gangs do not threaten or harm these 
children based on their religion, nationality, race, or political opinion.24  
Therefore, to establish refugee status, these youths must attempt to fit within 
the definition of an acceptable PSG.25 
                                                 
 20. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 6; see also Ramos-Lopez, 563 
F.3d at 857 (recounting the applicant’s history of receiving reptetitive threats of violence for his 
continued refusal to join the gang); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 580 (describing how gang 
members harassed and beat the applicants, threatening to kill them if they did not join the gang). 
 21. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 53–54 (noting how gangs have 
national or regional networks making internal relocation unsuccessful because gangs can locate 
their targets in both rural and urban settings outside of the neighborhoods they directly control). 
 22. See NIELAN BARNES, WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
TRANSNATIONAL YOUTH GANGS 8–9 (2007), available at http://www.wola.org/publications 
/transnational_study_cu_youth_gangs (explaining that weak states, like those in Central America, 
lack the capabilities required to contain gang violence in any meaningful way).  For example, El 
Salvador has been unable to contain gangs because of prison overpopulation, insufficient 
resources, and the police’s incapability to respond to the vast amount of criminal activity.  
Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 253.  Furthermore, the police are often absent, allowing gangs to 
effectively maintain control over their respective territories without state interference.  See, e.g., 
Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 4. 
 23. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 2. 
 24. Cf. id. ¶¶ 12–17 (describing the various categories of gang victims, including individuals 
resisting recruitment, former and current members, anti-gang advocates, and family members of 
those targeted by gangs).  Some applicants have applied for asylum on the theory that their 
resistance to gang recruitment equates to a manifestation of political opinion; however, these 
claims have not been any more successful than those involving PSGs.  See, e.g., Orellana-Monson 
v. Holder, 332 F. App’x 202, 203–04 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding that mere political 
opposition to gang activity is not enough to qualify for asylum based on persecution for political 
opinion); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding the principle 
that a mere “general aversion” to gang activity does not fit into the category of a political 
opinion), abrogated in part by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908–12 (9th Cir. 
2008).  But see Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 45–51 (describing 
circumstances in which gangs may be so intertwined with the state and state politics that 
consideration of whether opposition to gang activities is a political opinion may be warranted). 
 25. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (identifying the five “protected grounds” 
warranting asylum, and explaining the significance of the PSG category).  One commentator 
explained that, “[a] major hurdle to gang-based asylum claims is successfully fitting the claim 
into one of the five protected grounds.”  SEBASTIAN AMAR ET AL., CAIR COAL., SEEKING 
ASYLUM FROM GANG-BASED VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: A RESOURCE MANUAL 8 
(2007), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/GangResourceManual.pdf. 
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Youths who use their resistance to gang recruitment as the basis for a PSG 
have had only minimal success obtaining asylum in the United States.26  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals27 (Board) firmly holds that a PSG for children 
resisting gang recruitment is too “amorphous”—lacking the sufficient 
particularity required for a grant of asylum.28  Unless the applicant identifies a 
more particularized social group, the asylum claims of these youths will 
continue to be denied.29  Upon denial of their asylum claims, these children are 
removed from the United States and sent back to their home countries where 
they face harm and possible death at the hands of their persecutors—the gangs 
they refuse to join.30 
The rapid evolution of PSG analysis has created the potential to change this 
unfortunate result.31  In August 2010, an immigration judge granted asylum to 
a Mexican woman on remand in the matter of L.R. based on the woman’s fear 
of domestic violence.32  The immigration judge made a favorable grant based 
                                                 
 26. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing two decisions from the Board of Immigation Appeals 
denying PSG status to applicants who cited resistance to gang recruitment as grounds for asylum 
and positing that immigration judges and the Board will continue to deny similar applications in 
the future).  The few decisions that favor PSGs for children resisting gang recruitment come from 
immigration judges, but these opinions are often unreported.  Corsetti, supra note 12, at 421.  
Furthermore, even when these opinions exist, they are often difficult to obtain because they are 
not made public.  Id. at 421 n.83.  Only decisions from the appellate body—the Board—and from 
reviewing courts are available on commercial databases.  Id. 
 27. The Asylum Officer Corps of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a 
sub-agency of the Department of Homeland Security, adjudicates asylum claims in the first 
instance.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2009, at 4 (2010).  
Applicants who fail to establish eligibility for asylum to USCIS asylym officers and lack valid 
immigration status are subject to removal proceedings, presided over by an immigration judge of 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review.  Id.  During these proceedings, the immigration 
judge reviewing the matter “de novo” makes the eligibility determinaton independent of the 
officer’s decision.  For a detailed overview of this process, see Matter of L.R., U. CAL., HASTINGS 
CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://egrs.uchastings.edu/emphasis 
/matter%20of%20LR.php (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  The judge may grant asylum, or deny the 
application and order the alien’s removed from the United States. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., supra, at 4.  If asylum is denied, the applicant may appeal to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals.  Id. 
 28. See, e.g., S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–85 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 29. See id.; see also Corsetti, supra note 12, at 421 (observing that an immigration judge is 
more likely to find a legitimate PSG with an increased showing of particularity). 
 30. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (2011). 
 31. See infra Part II (describing the most recent change in PSG analysis, which occurred in 
the matter of L.R.); infra Part III (discussing how the framework offered by the Department of 
Homeland Security in L.R. can be applied to children who resist gang recruitment). 
 32. Julia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting Standard on 
Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A14 (reporting on the decision as announcecd by 
the woman’s attorney).  The actual decision of the immigration judge, like all immigration judge 
decisions, is not public record. See Corsetti, supra note 12, at 421 n.83.  Asylum proceedings are 
conducted in private to protect the anonymity of the applicant, which is essential when the 
persecutor may still be searching for the applicant.  Id.  However, the attorney of record for the 
woman graciously provided redacted copies of the immigration judge’s order granting asylum, 
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upon a supplemental briefing submitted by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) at the request of the Board.33  The DHS brief set forth 
alternative ways of defining a PSG for victims of domestic violence seeking 
asylum.34  The analytical concepts devised by DHS, as applied to situations 
involving domestic violence, reveal a promising avenue for formulating a 
successful PSG for children resisting gang recruitment.35  
This Note examines the recent grant of asylum in the matter of L.R. and 
advocates for the application of DHS’s PSG analysis in that matter to children 
seeking asylum based on persecution for resisting gang recruitment.  First, this 
Note discusses an applicant’s burden of establishing their eligibility for asylum 
on the grounds of membership in a PSG.  This discussion outlines the 
                                                                                                                 
Department of Homeland Security’s supplemental brief filed in the matter at the request of the 
Board, and the applicant’s response brief.  This Note utilizes information gathered from these 
sources, which are on file with the author, as well as from media reports. See, e.g., Obtaining 
Asylum in the United States, USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9b 
b95919f35e66f614176543f6dla/?vgnextoid=dab9f067e3183210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD
&vgnextchannel=f39de4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated Mar. 10, 
2011). 
 33. Supplemental Brief of Department of Homeland Security at 3, L.R. [redacted] (B.I.A. 
Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter DHS Supplemental Brief], available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu 
/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf.  The procedural history of this matter is 
important in understanding how the decision was rendered.  In October 2007, the immigration 
judge denied the application for asylum based on past and future potential domestic violence.  Id. 
at 2.  On appeal, the Board requested supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the 
applicants, L.R. and her two sons as derivative beneficiaries, qualified as members of a PSG with 
claims based on domestic violence.  Id. at 3.  In April 2009, DHS submitted a brief stating its 
current postion on whether, in general, domestic-violence victims with similar claims are 
members of a PSG, but DHS also went one step further.  See id. at 4–5.  Because asylum 
applicants have the burden of proof, DHS normally limits its briefing to critiques of the PSG 
analyses asserted by the applicant.  Id.  However, DHS—recognizing the unsettled nature of the 
law as applied to domestic-violence claims—offered alternative analyses to qualify asylum 
applicants as members of a PSG to propogate clarity in this area of law.  Id. at 5.  In light of these 
alternatives, DHS recommended remanding the matter to the immigration judge for further  
fact-finding.  Id.  Shortly preceeding this brief, DHS and the applicants had filed a joint motion 
seeking the same.  Brief of the Respondent in Support of Applications for Asylum, Withholding 
of Removal, and CAT Relief at 2, L.R. [redacted] (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Applicant’s 
Brief] (on file with the author); see also Matter of L.R., supra note 27.  On remand, the applicants 
submitted their supplemental brief, which applied their factual background to the alternatives set 
forth by DHS.  Applicant’s Brief supra at 3–4.  DHS, upon review of the new evidence, agreed 
that the applicants were eligible for asylum, which the judge subsequently granted on August 4, 
2010 “by stipulation of the parties.”  Matter of L.R., supra note 27; see also Order of the 
Immigration Judge on Remand at 1, L.R. [redacted] (Aug. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Order of the 
Immigration Judge] (on file with the author). 
 34. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 3–5.  Because the regulations provide that 
only decisions by the Board and Attorney General are binding precedent, the DHS brief and the 
immigration judge’s decision are only persuasive authority.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2011); see 
also Matter of L.R., supra note 27. 
 35. See infra Parts II–III; cf. Matter of L.R., supra note 27 (explaining that the reasoning in 
DHS’s brief provides a sound approach to the creation of PSGs related to gender-based claims). 
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precedential decisions that helped form the current asylum-eligibility analyses.  
Next, this Note considers how the Board and federal circuit courts of appeals 
have regulated prior articulations of PSGs for children resisting gang 
recruitment.  Then, this Note describes the facts underlying the matter of L.R. 
and analyzes the frameworks used by DHS to identify viable PSGs in its 
supplemental brief.  In particular, this Note identifies which elements of these 
frameworks should be applied to asylum claims beyond those involving 
victims of domestic violence.  In conclusion, this Note applies the L.R. 
frameworks by analogy and proposes a PSG that establishes asylum eligibility 
for children resisting gang recruitment.   
I.  THE BURDEN ON CHILDREN RESISTING GANG RECRUITMENT TO PROVE 
REFUGEE STATUS BASED ON MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
Asylum requires an applicant to prove that he or she meets the statutory 
definition of a refugee.36  A grant of asylum is discretionary,37 and is only 
available if the applicant satisfies four elements: the applicant has a subjective 
fear of persecution, the fear is well-founded, the persecution is based on one or 
more of the five protected grounds, and the applicant is unable or unwilling to 
return to his home country because of that persecution.38 
A.  Interpreting Congressional Silence: Defining the Elements of Asylum 
The terms “fear of persecution,” “on account of . . . membership in a 
particular social group,” and “unable or unwilling” all figure prominently in 
the statutory definition of refugee, but lack separate and precise definitions.39  
                                                 
 36. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 37. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney 
General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the 
requirements and procedures established by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney 
General under this section if the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General 
determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 38. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text; see also Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,  
218–19 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.  
Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987).  If an applicant can establish past persecution, the 
asylum officer and immigration judge must presume that the applicant has a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.  See id.  The presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the 
evidence, showing that changed circumstances in the applicant’s home country have vitiated the 
applicant’s well-founded fear or that relocation within that country would alleviate that fear.  Id.  
For example, this presumption would be rebutted if an applicant claimed past persecution by a 
past communist regime, but the regime no longer existed in the present day.  E.g., N-M-A-, 22 I. 
& N. Dec. 312, 314–15 (B.I.A. 1998) (explaining the applicant was ineligible for asylum because 
his fear of persecution by Afghanistan’s communist government disappeared after the regime was 
toppled). 
 39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
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This congressional silence consequently requires the Board and various courts 
of appeals to interpret their meanings.40 
1.  An Applicant’s Motivation for Seeking Asylum Must Be Based on a “Fear 
of Persecution” 
Whether premised on incidents that occurred in the past or those that are 
likely to occur in the future, an applicant’s need for asylum must stem from a 
fear of being persecuted in his or her home country.41  Congress, however, has 
never defined “fear of persecution.”42  In the absence of express legislative 
direction, the Board and federal circuit courts have attempted to interpret the 
meaning of this phrase.43   
In the matter of Acosta, the Board contemplated at length what constitutes a 
“fear of persecution.”44  The Board determined that a genuine “fear” of facing 
persecution in one’s home country must be the “primary motivation” of an 
asylum seeker.45  The Board then defined “persecution” as “suffering or harm 
[inflicted upon an individual] in order to punish an individual for possessing a 
belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome.”46  In defining the term, 
the Board also suggested the level of harm or suffering required to prove 
“persecution.”47  Based on prior case law, the Board explained that 
confinement, torture, and severe economic deprivations or restrictions may rise 
to the level of persecution, but found that generalized conditions of hardship or 
violence, especially those shared by a common population, do not.48 
This general definition has since been narrowed through subsequent  
case-by-case interpretation.  For example, the Third Circuit in Fatin v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service recognized that “persecution” does not 
include all that American society considers unjust or unlawful; rather, the term 
must be limited to extreme conduct to prevent an extraordinary number of 
individuals from qualifying for asylum.49  Because the United States cannot 
serve as a refuge for so many applicants, the court reasoned that Congress 
                                                 
 40. See infra Part I.A.1–3. 
 41. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 42. Id.; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 220. 
 43. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222–23 (discussing how the term “persecution” has been 
construed by various courts). 
 44. Id. at 221. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 222. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) (reasoning that if America’s standards of 
fairness and constitutionality are applied to the term “persecution,” then “a significant percentage 
of the world’s population would qualify for asylum in [the United States]—and it seems most 
unlikely that Congress intended such a result”).  The Third Circuit also clarified that subjective 
fear of persecution alone is insufficient to establish asylum, suggesting that the fear must be 
objectively reasonable.  Id. at 1241 n.11. 
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likely intended a much narrower interpretation that is commensurate with 
extreme conduct.50  Isolated incidents of verbal harassment,51 threats other than 
those directed against life or freedom,52 and trivial attempts at intimidation53 
are acts that other courts deemed insufficient to be considered “persecution” 
within the extreme-conduct standard set forth in Fatin. 
The decision by the First Circuit in Nelson v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Service illustrates the difficulty of meeting the extreme-conduct standard.54  In 
Nelson, the female asylum applicant claimed that she experienced past 
persecution through a combination of solitary confinement, physical abuse, and 
harassment.55  Despite the applicant’s repeated exposure to maltreatment, the 
court concluded that, although these incidents were unfortunate, occasional 
detention and physical harm did not warrant classification as persecution.56  
Although the applicant in Nelson fell short of proving persecution, others 
have managed to satisfy the extreme-conduct requirement.  For example, the 
applicant in Lukwago v. Ashcroft alleged repeated threats and beatings coupled 
with severe psychological trauma from forced confinement and exposure to 
murder; the Third Circuit found this treatment commensurate with 
persecution.57  Five years later, in Ngengwe v. Mukasey, the Eighth Circuit 
found that an applicant who suffered a combination of physical beatings, 
psychological distress, actual property confiscation, and threats of forced 
marriage could successfully prove past persecution.58 
These decisions demonstrate that to prove a “fear of persecution” an 
applicant must, at a minimum, exhibit an objectively reasonable fear of a 
persecutor’s threatened or actual extreme conduct.59  The conduct may cause 
                                                 
 50. See id. at 1240 n.10. 
 51. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding 
“menacing telephone calls” and verbal threats directed at the applicant and her family insufficient 
to meet the requisite standard for persecution). 
 52. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that persecution 
must constitute real threats to life or freedom). 
 53. See Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2008) (declaring that  
“low-level intimidation and harassment” are excluded from the definition of persecution (quoting 
Al Yatim v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 2008))). 
 54. 232 F.3d 258, 264–65 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 55. Id. at 264 (stating the applicant experienced three bouts of solitary confinement and 
multiple instances of abuse and harassment, including threatening phone calls and surveillance). 
 56. Id. (recognizing that the applicant was indeed mistreated, but finding that the 
mistreatment did not extend far beyond “harassment and annoyance”). 
 57. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 169–70 (describing the repeated physical and psychological abuse 
endured by the applicant as well as his forced exposure to the murder of his parents, and “the 
killing and physical torture of his fellow captives, innocent civilians, and government soldiers”). 
 58. Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1036–37 (remanded to the Board to determine whether the  
non-physical actions of the applicant’s in-laws constituted past persecution). 
 59. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text; see also Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 168, 170 
(finding that a combination of threats, beatings, and psychological trauma rose to the level of 
persecution). 
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physical or psychological harm, but the behavior must pose a genuine threat to 
the applicant’s life or freedom to satisfy the requirements of persecution.60 
2.  The Persecution that an Applicant Fears Must Be “on Account of” 
Membership in a Particular Social Group 
Experiencing general harm or suffering does not establish asylum 
eligibility.61  Rather, persecutors must inflict the requisite harm or suffering on 
the applicant in retaliation for a “belief or characteristic [that the applicant has 
which the] persecutor seeks to overcome.”62  This belief or characteristic must 
fall into one of the five protected grounds to be eligible for asylum.63  To prove 
that the feared persecution is on account of the applicant’s membership in a 
PSG, the applicant must: (1) identify an appropriate PSG; (2) prove 
membership in the identified PSG; and (3) demonstrate a nexus between that 
membership and the applicant’s persecution.64  
Read literally, the statutory language would permit any two individuals to 
qualify as a PSG.  To avoid this unintended result, certain limiting factors 
developed in the PSG analysis.  Similar to the development of “fear of 
persecution,” the Board’s decision in Acosta also marked the starting point for 
                                                 
 60. See supra notes 49–58. 
 61. See Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 447 (B.I.A. 1987) (“[F]earing retribution over 
purely personal matters, or aliens fleeing general conditions of violence and upheaval in their 
countries, would not qualify for asylum.”). 
 62. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 223 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Immigration  
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987); see also Amilcar-Orellana 
v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 86, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting the applicant’s appeal because the 
court agreed with the Board that the applicant’s past persecution was based on personal vendettas 
two gang members had against the applicant for providing the police with information about an 
arson the gang members started, not on his membership in a PSG of informants).  The Ninth 
Circuit has rejected the Board’s definition of “persecution” from Acosta to the extent that it 
requires proof of the persecutors’ subjective intent to punish the applicant, explaining a 
persecutor’s intent does not make the harm any less painful to the victim.  See Pitcherskaia v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997).  In 2010, the Ninth 
Circuit clarified that the motivation of the “persecutors” is important, however, to determining 
whether there is a nexus between the alleged conduct and a protected ground.  Zetino v. Hodler, 
622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Grava v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 205 
F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that persecutors are able to have mixed 
motives, which does not weaken the basis for asylum if the causal connection or nexus is there to 
begin with). 
 63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).  A causal connection must exist, establishing a 
nexus between the applicant’s membership in a PSG and the harm that he or she fears.  See, e.g., 
Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that because the 
applicant was harmed before the alleged gang recruitment, no causal connection existed between 
resisting the gang’s efforts and the persecution suffered); Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1016 (“An alien’s 
desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang 
members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). 
 64. See Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993); 
supra note 63. 
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interpretation of the phrase “membership in a particular social group.”65  
Although Congress did not define membership in a PSG,66 the Board 
recognized that the four other protected grounds—race, religion, nationality, 
and political opinion—all shared a commonality of being “immutable 
characteristics.”67  The Board reasoned that these grounds are immutable 
because they are either impossible to change or are so fundamental to an 
individual’s identity that he or she should not be required to change it.68  The 
Board then extended this immutability by implication to the meaning of 
membership in a PSG.69 
In addition to immutability, the Third Circuit in Lukwago v. Ashcroft 
concluded that the PSG must exist even in the absence of the claimed 
persecution.70  More recently, in C-A-, the Board added that members of a PSG 
must be “socially visible,” meaning that they must have characteristics that 
make them recognizable within their society,71 and that the group must be 
described with “particularity.”72  However, members of a PSG are neither 
required to associate with one another nor required to have anything in 
common aside from their immutable characteristics.73 
                                                 
 65. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; see, e.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239–40 (using the Board’s 
decision in Acosta as a starting point for interpreting the phrase “particular social group”). 
 66. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232. 
 67. Id. at 233 (applying ejusdem generis, a doctrine stating that general words enumerated 
in conjunction with specific words should be interpreted similarly to those specific words, to 
determine the meaning of “particular social group” in relation to the other enumerated protected 
grounds). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  Compare id. (noting that the immutable characteristic shared by members of the 
group might be “sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstnaces it might be a shared past 
experience”), with A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 71 (B.I.A. 2007) (affirming the immigration 
judge’s decision based on the reasoning that being wealthy is a changeable trait and therefore not 
immutable). 
 70. 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 71. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006).  Some believe this is a misreading of 
the guidelines set forth by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). See Gatimi v. 
Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[The standard of social visibility] makes no sense; 
nor has the Board attempted in this or any other case to explain the reasoning behind the criterion 
of social visibility.”); Email from Anonymous Immigration Judge to author (Feb. 9, 2011, 09:51 
EST) (on file with author) (“[T]he B.I.A. (and some courts) twisted the ‘social visibility’ factor to 
restrict, rather than expand protection as the [U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees] intended.”).  
Publications by the UNHCR are not binding on the U.S. government; however, they are 
persuasive and should help “steer the adjudication” of asylum claims.  See Andrew Morton  
& Wendy A. Young, Children Asylum Seekers Face Challenges in the United States, 20 REFUGE 
13, 17–18 (2002). 
 72. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957 (rejecting the proposed PSG of “noncriminal informants” 
as “too loosely defined”). 
 73. Id. at 956–57.  Despite its opponents, several circuits have “gradually approved ‘social 
visibiliy’ as a criterion” in the PSG analysis.  Id. at 616 (citing to decisions by the First, Second, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
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Asylum applicants claiming membership in groups deemed “too 
amorphous” will be rejected.74  However, in decisions such as A-M-E-, the 
Board has alluded to the possibility of constructing a PSG using a typically 
amorphous characteristic if that characteristic can be more specifically defined 
under particular circumstances.75  The Eighth Circuit, in Ngengwe, further 
cautioned that an overly narrow PSG would also be rejected.76  Although an 
overly narrow PSG may describe why one individual experiences persecution, 
the constricted description defeats the creation of a “group.”77 
As discussed, qualifying for asylum on account of membership in a 
particular social group is challenging.  First, an applicant must identify an 
immutable characteristic.78  Second, an applicant must construct a PSG around 
their immutable characteristic that is neither too broad nor too narrow.79  
Finally, an applicant must show that he or she is a member of this precisely 
defined group, and that he or she has been persecuted or “has a well-founded 
fear of persecution” on account of membership in this group.80 
3.  Asylum Must Be an Applicant’s Last Hope for Shelter from an “Unable 
or Unwilling” State of Origin 
When an applicant can prove that the persecution they fear is on account of 
membership in a PSG, the final hurdle entails proving that their home country 
cannot or will not supply relief from the harm.81  This most often arises in one 
of two circumstances; either the home country’s government is the 
                                                 
 74. See, e.g., S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–85 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting “wealthy” as a 
sufficiently particular immutable characteristic because it is a term that depends on personal 
perspective for definitional limits, and one’s wealth may change from day to day).  An asserted 
PSG will be deemed “amorphous,” if the terms defining that PSG are subject to varying 
interpretations, thereby preventing a common understanding of the group’s composition.  Id. at 
585. 
 75. See, e.g., A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 75 n.6 (B.I.A. 2007).  For example, “wealth” as 
the only shared characteristic of a PSG is too amorphous because “the concept of wealth is so 
indeterminate.”  Id. at 76.  However, “should a government institute a policy of imprisoning and 
mistreating persons with assets or income above a fixed level,” the proposed PSG would more 
clearly delineate members from nonmembers based on unchanging characteristics.  Id. at 75 n.6. 
 76. Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1034 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that society would 
not realistically perceive an overly narrow collection of characteristics as a distinct social group). 
 77. Id. (“[A] widowed Cameroonian female member of the Bamileke tribe, in the Southern 
region that belongs to a family or has in-laws from a different tribe and region . . . who have 
falsely accused her of causing her husband’s death” identifies only one person’s situation—not 
that of a group). 
 78. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Immigration  
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987). 
 79. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 80. Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993); see 
also supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text. 
 81. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
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persecutor,82 or the government cannot or will not control non-governmental 
persecutors.83  The statute denotes this requirement as an inability or 
unwillingness of an applicant to avail himself or herself of protection.84 
Once again, the Board’s decision in Acosta led the way in defining the 
language of the statute.85  In Acosta, the Board determined that to receive 
asylum, the threat of persecution to an applicant must be countrywide.86  
Additionally, the regulations require that asylum be denied if relocation 
anywhere within one’s home country would provide a safe option, and such 
internal relocation would be a reasonable expectation under the 
circumstances.87  The Ninth Circuit, in Cardenas v. Immigration  
& Naturalization Service, asserted that the relocation must offer more than a 
temporary “post-threat harmless period.”88 
B.  Previously Rejected PSGs Relative to Children Resisting Gang Recruitment 
To maintain their influence over urban areas in Central America,89 gangs are 
forcibly recruiting neighborhood children under the age of twelve.90  Gangs 
recognize the vulnerability of these children due to their young age91 and 
                                                 
 82. See Llana-Castellon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 16 F.3d 1093, 1098, 1100 
(10th Cir. 1994) (revising and remanding the Board’s decision to overrule the immigration 
judge’s finding of a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of the Sandista government). 
 83. See id. at 1097; see also Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 442 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[The 
applicant] assert[ed] that . . . gang members would torture him with the awareness—or willful 
blindness—of government officials.”); Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(“An applicant must show the government’s acquiescence in the persecutor’s acts or its inability 
or unwillingness to investigate and punish those acts, and not just a general difficulty preventing 
the occurrence of particular future crimes.”).  The home government’s efforts or lack thereof must 
rise to the level of mistreatment because no government can provide absolute protection to all of 
its citizens.  Keiser, 505 F.3d. at 42–43. 
 84. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 85. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 235 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Immigration  
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987). 
 86. Id. 
 87. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(ii) (2006). 
 88. 294 F.3d 1062, 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).  Otherwise, the Cardenas court concluded, 
relocation amounts to nothing more than a small hurdle for persecutors to overcome in reaching 
their target.  See id. 
 89. Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 376–78 (discussing the prevalence of gangs in urban 
Central America). 
 90. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 7–8; McGuire, supra note 8, at 2. 
 91. See David E. Arredondo, Principles of Child Development and Juvenile Justice: 
Information for Decision-Makers, 5 J. CTR. FAM., CHILD. & CTS. 127, 127 (2004) (observing that 
juveniles are “still in the process of neurobiological, psychological, social, and moral 
development” and thus are very sensitive to environmental influences).  Adolescents are 
especially susceptible to gang demands because their brains cause them to act impulsively and 
instinctively in emotionally charged situations.  See id. at 129.  Adults would be less susceptible 
to gang recruitment, on the other hand, because they use the part of their brain associated with 
reason to process emotionally charged decisions.  See id. 
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economic disadvantage.92  Gangs also target children under twelve, who are 
generally immune from prosecution under the laws of El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras.93  Furthermore, a lack of alternatives makes gang recruitment 
an enticing option for young adolescents.94 
Children who resist gang recruitment often find themselves in dangerous 
situations.95  Gangs see resistance to their demands as a sign of disrespect, 
punishable by harsh treatment.96  The violence subsides only if the child finally 
agrees to join the gang,97 the gang abandons efforts to recruit the child and 
decides to kill the child instead,98 or the child is able to relocate safely out of 
the gang’s reach.99 
Central American states such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have 
attempted to control gang violence through harsh social-cleansing practices 
known as mano dura, which target suspected gang members.100  However, 
                                                 
 92. See supra notes 11, 18 and accompanying text; see also USAID, CENTRAL AMERICA 
AND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT 15 (2006), available at http://www.usaid.gov/locations 
/latin_america_caribbean/democracy/gangs_assessment.pdf (stating several risk factors that make 
children susceptible to joining a gang, including poor economic situations and limited access to 
jobs or educational opportunities). 
 93. Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 237 (noting that in these countries, children under the age of 
twelve cannot be legally tried as adults, and generally the highest penalty available upon capture 
is having their parent or guardian notified).  Furthermore, children under the age of twelve are 
afforded special protections from legal liability and exploitation.  Id. at 247.  By recruiting young 
children to carry out illegal activities, these loopholes allow gangs to avoid the legal 
consequences of getting caught.  See id. at 237–47.  See also Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 332 F. 
App’x 202, 203–04 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We are cognizant of extensive gang activity in El Salvador 
and also of the gang’s despicable practice of recruiting young children to commit crimes.”); 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 502 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that 
young gang members engage in illegal activities like drug trafficking and murder). 
 94. See Corsetti, supra note 12, at 413–14. 
 95. See supra note 1 (providing examples of threats that resistance to gang recruitment 
yields). 
 96. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text; see also Guidance Note on Refugee 
Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 22 (stating that threats and violence are the primary methods gangs 
employ to coerce an individual to join the gang). 
 97. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 502 F.3d at 287 (noting that the gang members who attacked 
the applicant screamed, “Don’t run.  Don’t be afraid.  Sooner or later you will join us.”);  
S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 580 (B.I.A. 2008) (describing persistant threats to the applicants’ 
lives if they continued to resist recruitment). 
 98. See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 502 F.3d at 287 (highlighting the applicant’s testimony 
that the gang told him they would no longer offer membership and they were going to kill him 
instead); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 580. 
 99. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 53–54 (discussing the option of 
relocating to evade persecution and noting the often expansive reach of gangs, which—when 
country- or region-wide—can render internal relocation ineffective); see supra note 1 (providing 
examples of asylum seekers fleeing from gang persecution); see also, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 
502 F.3d 287 (involving an applicant who fled to the United States from Honduras because of 
gang threats). 
 100. See, e.g., Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 9 (noting that these mano 
dura policies target suspected gang members for unlawful arrests, police violence, and 
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these efforts have been counterproductive; gangs have adapted to these policies 
with increased organization and decreased visibility, resulting in minimal 
improvement to public security.101  As a result, the police offer little protection 
to children targeted for recruitment.102  Because most gangs have country-wide 
networks, adequate relocation often requires finding a safe haven in another 
country.103  Children seeking refuge from gang recruitment commonly apply 
for asylum in the United States.104 
1.  The Companion Cases of S-E-G- and E-A-G-: Children Resisting Gang 
Recruitment Are Not Eligible for Asylum 
Striking a delicate balance between a group that is neither overly broad nor 
exceedingly narrow is essential to crafting an appropriate PSG.105  In 2008, the 
Board decided, in companion cases S-E-G- and E-A-G-, that PSGs involving 
children resisting gang recruitment were too amorphous to warrant a grant of 
asylum because they lacked the social-visibility requirement.106  To date, no 
published opinion has granted asylum to a child who has resisted gang 
recruitment based on a PSG analysis.107 
                                                                                                                 
extrajudicial killings); see also McGuire, supra note 8, at 3–5 (criticizing the mano dura policies 
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras as highly ineffective). 
 101. BARNES, supra note 22, at 2; McGuire, supra note 8, at 4. 
 102. See supra note 22; see also McGuire, supra note 8, at 4 (observing that the police have 
lost control and often target youths in general for punishment associated with gang activities). 
 103. See, e.g., S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 580 (describing the testimony of a professor at 
Central American University about the improbability of relocating in a small country like El 
Salvador because a gang’s influence can extend to every corner of the country). 
 104. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 2 (“During recent years, an 
increasing number of claims have been made especially in . . . the United States of America, 
notably by young people from Central America who fear persecution at the hands of violent 
gangs in their countries of origin.”). 
 105. See supra notes 76–79, 82 and accompanying text. 
 106. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593–96 (B.I.A. 2008); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 588. 
 107. See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 443–44 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the PSG 
consisting of “young, Americanized, well-off, Salvadoran male deportee with a criminal history 
who opposes gangs”); Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 108–09 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting the PSG 
defined as “young Guatemalan men recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment”); 
Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 332 F. App’x 202, 203 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the PSG identified 
as “Salvadoran males between the ages of eight and fifteen who have been recruited but who do 
not wish to belong to a gang”); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting the PSG articulated as “young Honduran men who have been recruited by the MS-13, 
but who refuse to join”); Cruz-Alvarez v. Holder, 320 F.App’x 273, 274 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting 
the PSG defined as “children targeted for recruitment into gangs”); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 
542 F.3d 738, 741, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the PSG described as “the class of young 
men in El Salvador who resist the violence and intimidation of gang rule”), abrogated in party by 
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908–12 (9th Cir. 2009); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. 
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 502 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2007) (declining to decide whether “young 
Honduran men who have been actively recruited by gangs and who have refused to join the 
gangs” is a PSG because the petition was denied for lack of a causal nexus to a protected ground); 
E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594 (rejecting the PSG articulated as “persons resistant to gang 
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In S-E-G-, two male children from El Salvador were denied asylum after 
claiming persecution on account of membership in a PSG defined as 
“Salvadoran youth who refused recruitment into the MS-13 criminal gang.”108  
After the boys were beaten for refusing to join MS-13, the gang members told 
them that further refusal might result in “their bodies end[ing] up in a 
dumpster.”109  Before leaving El Salvador, the applicants’ fears intensified 
when they learned that another boy in the neighborhood was shot and killed 
after refusing the same gang’s recruitment efforts.110   
Relying on the definition of “particular social group” set forth in Acosta and 
focusing on the terms “social visibility” and “particularity” emphasized in  
C-A-, the Board found that the asserted PSG—“Salvadoran youth who refused 
recruitment into the MS-13 criminal gang”—was too amorphous.111  
According to the Board, the PSG, as articulated by the applicants, lacked 
sufficient particularity because it encompassed a “large and diffuse” portion of 
society and the motivations of the gang members to target youth varied.112  The 
Board questioned whether the gangs limited their recruitment to children with 
shared characteristics of economic disadvantages and proximity to MS-13 
central areas, or whether these characteristics merely made them easier 
targets.113  The Board also failed to recognize a “socially visible” group 
because no evidence indicated that gangs or society in general perceived youth 
refusing recruitment as an identifiable group.114  It found little distinction 
between the way gangs targeted the applicants compared to the Salvadorian 
public.115  Despite contrary guidance from the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR),116 the Board based their denial of asylum on the 
observation that the harm the applicants faced was no more severe than the 
harm anyone else in El Salvador would encounter if they defied a gang’s 
wishes.117 
                                                                                                                 
membership”); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 590 (rejecting the PSG defined as “Salvadoran youth 
who refused recruitment into the MS-13 criminal gang”). 
 108. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 579, 590. 
 109. Id. at 580. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. at 582–83, 590; see supra Part I.A.2 (using case law that defined “particular social 
group,” “social visibility,” and “particularity”). 
 112. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 585–86. 
 113. Id. at 585. 
 114. Id. at 586–87. 
 115. Id. at 587. 
 116. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 35 (noting that a group need not 
experience a higher incidence of targeting than the general public to qualify as a PSG); see also 
infra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (explaining the guidance given by the UNHCR on this 
matter). 
 117. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 587–88 (explaining that because gang violence invades 
almost all aspects of Salvadoran life, violence is not limited to those who resist recruitment 
efforts); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text (stating that generalized harm and 
suffering do not warrant asylum). 
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Although it involved a very different fact pattern, the companion case,  
E-A-G-, similarly found that the named PSG did not warrant a grant of 
asylum.118  In E-A-G-, the applicant declined his cousin’s invitation to join a 
gang, but he was not directly threatened or harmed in response.119  The 
applicant’s family received threats from people whom the applicant believed to 
be gang members, but he could not confirm gang members were responsible, 
nor did he know why his family was being threatened.120  Nonetheless, the 
immigration judge found the applicant to be a member of the PSG defined as 
“persons resistant to gang membership.”121  The Board disagreed and focused 
heavily on the PSG’s lack of social visibility: “[t]here is no showing that 
[persons who resist joining gangs] are of concern to anyone in Honduras . . . or 
that . . . [they] are seen as a segment of the population in any meaningful 
respect.”122 
Subsequent circuit court decisions, such as Ramos-Lopez v. Holder and 
Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, frequently cite to these two companion cases to 
uphold the conclusion that PSGs pertaining to children resisting gang 
recruitment are too amorphous and lack social visibility.123  In Ramos-Lopez, 
the Ninth Circuit suggested that a shared experience of gang recruitment is too 
broad and diverse to stand as the only commonality among individuals in an 
articulated group.124  Furthermore, agreeing with S-E-G-,125 the court in 
Santos-Lemus held that resistors are not eligible for asylum because gang 
violence is so widespread in Central America that the general population is 
exposed to the same harm.126 
                                                 
 118. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 119. Id. at 592. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 593. 
 122. Id. at 594–95 (explaining that the PSG was not “socially visible,” and lacked any 
identifiable characteristics, thus precluding asylum). 
 123. Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009) (using the companion cases 
to conclude that the applicant did not assert an eligible PSG in “young Salvadoran men refusing 
gang recruitment efforts”); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 2008) (using 
S-E-G- to conclude that the asserted PSG of “young [men] in El Salvador resisting gang violence 
unstoppable by the police” was not socially visible and even less particular than the PSG 
considered in S-E-G-), abrogated in part by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908–12 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 124. See Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 862.  Shortly after deciding Ramos-Lopez, the Ninth 
Circuit confirmed its reasoning.  See Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting the applicant’s argument because it was indistinguishable from that proposed in  
Ramos-Lopez). 
 125. See S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 587–88 (B.I.A. 2008) (explaining that gang violence 
“affects all segments of” El Salvador). 
 126. See, e.g., Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 746 (rejecting the asserted PSG, in part for its lack 
of social visibility, because the asserted harassment was merely a part of “general community and 
civil unrest,” rather than a specific targeting of PSG members). 
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A recent decision from the First Circuit summarized the major reasons that 
PSGs premised on resisting gang recruitment have been rejected.127  In Larios 
v. Holder the court rejected the asserted PSG of “young Guatemalan men 
recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment.”128  The court agreed 
with the immigration judge that the gang targeted the applicant in a general 
attempt to increase the gang’s numbers rather than on account of the 
applicant’s membership in the PSG.129  The court first reasoned that the PSG 
was not socially visible because it lacked recognizable characteristics to make 
it stand out in the community as a distinct group;130 also, the PSG was not 
sufficiently particular because the ambiguity of the terms used to define the 
PSG made discerning members from non-members “virtually impossible.”131 
As indicated by S-E-G- and E-A-G-, the Board believes that PSGs 
concerning “resistance to gang recruitment” should be rejected as overly broad, 
amorphous, and lacking in social visibility.132  Without a PSG that sufficiently 
articulates an immutable characteristic, showcases particularity, and 
exemplifies social visibility, courts will continue to deny asylum to individuals 
who resist gang recruitment.133 
II.  THE MATTER OF L.R.: DHS PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON ARTICULATING 
ACCEPTABLE PSGS 
Similar to the treatment of asylum claims from children resisting gang 
recruitment, immigration judges and the Board regularly denied asylum to 
victims of domestic abuse until recently.134  On August 4, 2010, after 
considering the position advocated by DHS in a supplemental brief to the 
Board, an immigration judge on remand granted asylum to a Mexican woman 
                                                 
 127. See Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105–09 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 128. Id. at 108–09. 
 129. Id. at 109.  But see Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 502 F.3d 285, 
291 (3d Cir. 2007) (“No reasonable factfinder could conclude that [the applicant] was attacked for 
any reason other than his status as a young Honduran man who had been recruited to join [a] gang 
and refused to join.”). 
 130. Larios, 608 F.3d at 109 (citing Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26–27 (1st Cir. 
2010)). 
 131. Id. at 109 (“There are . . . questions about who may be considered ‘young,’ the type of 
conduct that may be considered ‘recruit[ment],’ and the degree to which a person must display 
‘resist[ance].’  These are ambiguous group characteristics, largely subjective, that fail to establish 
a sufficient level of particularity.” (alteration in original) (quoting Mendez-Barrera, 602 F.3d at 
27)). 
 132. See supra notes 102–22 and accompanying text. 
 133. Cf. Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that 
deference is given to the Board’s published decisions when dealing with ambiguous terms in the 
Immigation and Naturalization Act (citing Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908–12 
(9th Cir. 2009))). 
 134. See Preston, supra note 32, at A14 (recognizing that the grant of asylum in the matter of 
L.R. brought “new clarity to asylum law after almost 15 years of arcane and tangled litigation, 
when [asylum] claims from domestic abuse victims were regularly dismissed”). 
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known as “L.R.” based on her membership in a PSG premised on domestic 
violence 135  The result for L.R. indicates a significant progression in PSG 
analyses.136  DHS’s proposed alternatives for asserting PSGs in L.R. are of 
equal significance to the formulation of new PSGs outside of the  
domestic-violence context.137 
A.  The Facts Underlying the Matter of L.R. 
L.R., a female applicant from Mexico, suffered severe long-term abuse at the 
hands of her common-law husband.138  The two had lived together with their 
three children.139  Over the course of several decades, L.R.’s husband regularly 
raped her and threatened her with weapons140 because, according to L.R., her 
husband believed that he owned L.R. by virtue of his dominant position in their 
relationship.141  L.R. tried to escape captivity numerous times; once when she 
was two months pregnant, her husband caught her, locked her in a room, and 
tried to burn her alive.142  L.R. could not safely relocate to another part of 
Mexico because her husband used the Internet to track her down.143  The police 
offered L.R. no protection—“[s]he would show the police her bruises and 
                                                 
 135. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.  The applicant is known only by her 
initials because asylum cases are kept confidental.  See Preston, supra note 32, at A14; supra note 
32. 
 136. Amy Lieberman, Is Domestic Violence Cause for US to Grant Asylum?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/02101/is-domestic-
violence-cause-for-US-to-grant-asylum (reporting that DHS’s supplemental brief and the grant of 
asylum to L.R. signal a policy shift in the United States’ approach to victims of domestic violence 
seeking asylum).  As an example of previous policies, the Board squarely denied asylum to a 
Guatemalan victim of domestic violence in the matter of R-A-.  See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 
927–28 (B.I.A. 1999).  The applicant claimed membership in the PSG of “Guatemalan women 
who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women 
are to live under male domination.”  Id. at 911.  According to an attorney at the center for Gender 
and Refugee Studies (CGRS), the grant rates for asylum cases involving domestic violence have 
significantly increased since L.R. because many judges now feel more confident granting these 
petitions.  Lieberman, supra (quoting Lisa Frydman, senior attorney at CGRS). 
 137. See infra Part III; see also Matter of L.R., supra note 27 (noting that DHS’s analysis is 
not limited to domestic violence and can be applied broadly to gender-based claims). 
 138. See Preston, supra note 32, at A14. CGRS, a group that represented L.R. during part of 
her struggle to gain asylum in the United States, asserts that L.R. did not voluntarily choose this 
man to be her common-law husband.  Matter of L.R., supra note 27.  L.R. met her common-law 
husband when she was at a teacher training school in Mexico, where he was the school’s sports 
coach.  Id.  He was almost fifteen years her senior and raped her at gunpoint.  Id.  Afterward, he 
made L.R. his prisoner for two decades using violence and death threats.  Id. 
 139. Matter of L.R., supra note 27.  These three children were conceived because L.R.’s 
husband raped her.  See supra note 33. 
 140. Preston, supra note 32, at A14. 
 141. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15. 
 142. Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 10 (explaining that L.R. was a teacher, and had to 
register her personal information online each time she relocated). 
 143. Id. at 26–27. 
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injuries, but the police [would not help her because her husband’s abuse was a] 
private [matter] and her life was not in danger.”144 
L.R. first filed for asylum in the United States in December 2005.145  An 
immigration judge denied her asylum claim in 2007.146  L.R. appealed this 
decision to the Board, which then requested supplemental briefing from the 
applicant and DHS.147 Upon a joint motion, the matter was remanded to the 
immigration judge for further fact finding.148 
B.  Acceptable PSG Formulations for Victims of Domestic Violence 
DHS’s supplemental brief expressed the agency’s position on whether 
victims of domestic violence can establish themselves as a “particular social 
group” for purposes of asylum eligibility.149  DHS intended the brief to serve 
as a guide for asylum claims, and set forth PSG formulations that could qualify 
applicants for asylum.150  DHS proposed two alternative PSGs that would be 
acceptable for victims of domestic violence.151 
When L.R. initially applied for asylum, her proposed PSG was “Mexican 
women in an abusive domestic relationship who are unable to leave.”152 DHS 
quickly disposed of this proposal in its entirety as circular, because the 
immutable characteristic of the PSG cannot be the same as the persecution 
feared, which, in this case, would be abuse in a domestic relationship.153  
                                                 
 144. Id. at 11–12.  Furthermore, police officers told L.R.’s husband that L.R. had 
complained, causing her husband to retaliate against L.R. with more servere beatings and 
punishment.  Id. at 12.  L.R. even contacted a Mexican judge for protection, but the judge only 
offered to help in exchange for sexual favors.  Id. at 16–17.  L.R. refused.  Id. at 17. 
 145. Id. at 1.  However, this was not the first time L.R. attempted to come to the United 
States. Id. at 12–13.  She first fled to the United States in 1991, but her husband found her and 
threatened to take the children and kill her family if she did not return to his household.  Id.  She 
returned to Mexico in 1993, but he continued to physically and verbally abuse her and the 
children.  Id. at 21.  L.R. realized that he would not stop until he killed her; therefore, she fled to 
the United States with the children in 2004.  Id.  She did not immediately seek asylum because of 
the psychological trauma that decades of abuse wrought.  Id. at 21–22. 
 146. See supra note 33.  The immigration judge found that she was barred from asylum 
because her claim was not timely (an issue which is not relevant to this Note), and her past 
persecution did not satisfy any of the protected grounds for asylum; rather, the judge found that 
the beatings were merely a result of her husband’s violent nature. Matter of L.R., supra note 27. 
 147. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 2–3. 
 148. Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 2–3; see also supra note 33. 
 149. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 4. 
 150. Id. at 5 (“[I]n order to contribute to a process leading to the creation of better guidance 
to both adjudicators and litigants, the Department will offer here alternative formulations of 
‘particular social group[s]’ that could, in appropriate cases, qualify aliens for asylum . . . .”). 
 151. Id. at 14. 
 152. Id. at 5. 
 153. Id. at 10–11 (explaining that L.R.’s proposed PSG was fatally flawed because the 
“abusive domestic relationship” was not only the immutable characteristic of the PSG, but also 
the persecution that L.R. feared).  DHS, agreeing with the UNCHR, concluded that permitting 
this circular logic would be the equivalent of declaring that persecution no longer has to be on 
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Hence, DHS constructed new PSGs using the definition of “particular social 
group” set out in the matter of Acosta and clarified through subsequent case 
law, emphasizing the more recently identified elements of “social visibility” 
and “particularity” from C-A-.154  DHS concluded that L.R. could qualify for 
one of two acceptable PSGs upon remand: (1) “Mexican women in domestic 
relationships who are unable to leave”; or (2) “Mexican women who are 
viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic 
relationship.”155 
III.  USING THE PSGS ARTICULATED IN THE MATTER OF L.R. TO CREATE A PSG 
FOR RESISTING GANG RECRUITMENT 
Although the immigration judge did not issue a written opinion explaining 
the merits of L.R.’s asylum application, one must infer from the grant that L.R. 
satisfied each of the requisite elements: (1) identifying a particular social 
group; (2) establishing her membership in the identified PSG; (3) proving a 
“well-founded” fear of persecution on account of her membership in the PSG; 
and (4) illustrating that she would not be safe from her persecutor by relocating 
within Mexico.156  Satisfying elements two, three, and four requires application 
of the asylum seeker’s particular facts to the legal rules set forth in the above 
discussions of the law; however, this factual analysis is predicated on the 
establishment of a visible PSG, which is solely a legal determination.157  
Because DHS focused on the legal principles of constructing PSGs without 
focusing on a particular set of facts, the analytical framework that DHS used in 
                                                                                                                 
account of one of the five protected grounds.  Id. at 6 (reasoning that this circular logic equates to 
a PSG of “individuals [that] are targeted for persecution because they belong to a group of 
individuals who are targeted for persecution”). 
 154. Id. at 7–21; see supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the elements of appropriate PSGs as defined 
through case law). 
 155. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 14–15.  DHS noted that this was not an 
exhaustive list of possible PSG formulations for victims of domestic violence because much 
depends on a case-by-case analysis.  Id. at 11 n.9. 
 156. See Order of the Immigration Judge, supra note 33; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) 
(2006); supra Part.I.A (explaining these elements of establishing refugee status using membership 
in a PSG as the protected ground).  This inference is appropriate because the regulations place the 
affirmative burden on the applicant to prove each element to establish eligibility for asylum.  See 
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2011).  According to the CGRS, which represented L.R. in this matter, 
DHS submitted a filing to the judge and agreed, after reviewing L.R.’s response brief, that L.R. 
was eligible for asylum.  Matter of L.R., supra note 27. 
 157. See S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 580–81 (B.I.A. 2008) (explaining that before 
analyzing whether the applicant has demonstrated that he or she satisfies the elements of asylum, 
the Board must address whether the applicant has identified a PSG that is recognized under the 
law); see also Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (recognizing that although 
assessing the visibility of an asserted PSG requires a case-by-case analysis, PSGs must, in the 
first instance, satisfy the appropriate legal standards), overruled in part by Immigration  
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987). 
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L.R. may be applicable to scenarios beyond traditional domestic violence.158  
In particular, the framework can be used to define a PSG for children resisting 
gang recruitment.159 
A.  Immutable, Socially Visible, and Sufficiently Particular: Creating a PSG 
for Children Resisting Gang Recruitment 
Although individuals described as “women fearing harm on account of their 
inability to escape a domestic relationship”160 and “children fearing harm on 
account of their resistance to gang recruitment”161 may not seem to have a 
common basis for asylum, the groupings can be analyzed in a similar fashion.  
Asylum seekers can assert a PSG for children resisting gang recruitment by 
following the same four-step analysis that DHS set forth in its supplemental 
brief for the matter of L.R..162  Those asserting the PSG should define it as 
“Salvadoran, Guatemalan, or Honduran children under the age of twelve who 
gang members in control of their neighborhood expect to acquiesce to gang 
recruitment.”163 
1.  “Status Within a Relationship”: The Immutable Characteristic of the 
PSG 
As a starting point in its PSG analysis, DHS sought “to identify the specific 
characteristic that the persecutor targets in choosing his victim.”164  DHS 
identified the characteristic in L.R. as her subordinate status in the domestic 
relationship with her common-law husband; he perceived L.R. as his property, 
which he believed meant he had the right to abuse her.165   
After identifying the specific characteristic targeted for persecution, the 
applicant must show that the characteristic is immutable as set forth in 
Acosta.166  DHS stated that a characteristic could be immutable if “economic, 
social, physical, and other constraints” render leaving the relationship 
impossible, or if the persecutor refuses to recognize an end to the relationship, 
warranting a fear of future persecution.167  DHS recognized that L.R. satisfied 
this requirement through her persecutor’s repeated abuse, which she could not 
                                                 
 158. Matter of L.R., supra note 27 (discussing the potential for extending the framework 
beyond domestic violence). 
 159. See infra Part III.A (creating a PSG for children resisting gang recruitment by utilizing 
the logic found in L.R.). 
 160. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 14. 
 161. See supra note 109 (citing examples of asylum applicants asserting this PSG). 
 162. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15–21. 
 163. See infra Part III.A.1–3 (explaining why this PSG can provide a basis for asylum). 
 164. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15. 
 165. Id. at 15–16. 
 166. Id. at 16. 
 167. Id. 
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escape even after leaving him multiple times.168  Therefore, L.R.’s subordinate 
position in the relationship served as her immutable characteristic.169   
Applying DHS’s logic in L.R., the shared characteristic of children who 
resist gang recruitment is the “status” that these children occupy in the 
relationship with their persecutors.170  The specific characteristic of these 
children targeted by gangs is their subordinate status in relation to gang 
members.171  In countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, children 
have subordinate relationships to the gang members that control their 
neighborhoods because of their vulnerability.172  Gang members perceive  
at-risk children in the areas they control as subordinate to them because of their 
vulnerability, and therefore target them for recruitment through force and 
intimidation,173  Additionally, because gangs control those areas with at-risk 
children, they expect them to fill the lowest ranks of the gang’s hierarchy, 
further propagating their perception that these expected recruits are subordinate 
to gang members.174   
DHS’s analysis further proves the immutability of these children’s 
subordinate status in relation to the gang members who recruit them.  Expected 
recruits who resist gang recruitment efforts can be likened to a woman in an 
abusive relationship.  The abusive husband in L.R. expected L.R. to comply 
with his demands because he believed he “owned” L.R. by virtue of his role as 
the dominant spousal figure.175  Similarly, gangs believe that these children 
belong to them because the children reside in the neighborhoods that the gangs 
control.176  This belief of control is exemplified when these children resist a 
gang’s forcible recruitment, and gang members retaliate with threats, 
harassment, and violence.177  DHS asserted that similar retaliation shows the 
immutability of the subordinate status of domestic-violence victims who 
                                                 
 168. Id.; see also supra note 156 and accompanying text (explaining that after L.R.’s 
response brief, DHS argued that she satisfied the requirement for asylum). 
 169. See Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 49–50 (asserting that L.R.’s status in her 
domestic relationship was an immutable characteristic because her husband forced her into and 
made her remain in the relationship, refusing to accept that the relationship was over). 
 170. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (emphasizing that gangs exploit these 
children because of their social and economic disadvantages as well as other vulnerabilities). 
 173. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text. 
 174. See USAID, supra note 92, at 15 (observing that children “represent the lowest level of 
the gang supply chain”). 
 175. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15. 
 176. Cf. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 42 (noting that when a gang 
controls an area, its members will often target the children who live in the area for recruitment 
merely because of their residency within the gang’s sphere of control). 
 177. See, e.g., supra note 1; see also supra notes 95–99 (describing gang responses to 
individuals resisting recruitment). 
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challenged their spouses’ perceived control.178  Therefore, like L.R., these 
children cannot change their subordinate status because their persecutors—the 
gangs that control their neighborhoods—refuse to accept that these children 
resist recruitment.179 
Additional aspects of the proposed PSG, such as the children’s ages, 
locations, and vulnerability due to economic disadvantage also render their 
subordinate status immutable.180  As set forth in DHS’s brief, when “economic, 
social, physical, or other constraints [make] it impossible for the applicant to 
leave the relationship during the period when the persecution [is] inflicted,” the 
applicant’s status within the relationship may be immutable.181  Because many 
Central American gangs have country- or region-wide influence, children 
resisting gang recruitment may find their attempts to flee to another part of the 
country to avoid retaliation futile.182  Furthermore, young, economically 
deprived children, especially those without familial support, lack the ability 
and resources to relocate on their own.183  These constraints render it 
impossible for children resisting gang recruitment to change or escape their 
position in their role as expected recruit in relation to the gang.  Therefore, the 
proposed PSG of “Salvadoran, Guatemalan, or Honduran children under the 
age of twelve who gang members in control of their neighborhoods expect to 
acquiesce to gang recruitment” sets forth an appropriate immutable 
characteristic of individuals in a subordinate position.184 
2.  Social Visibility Is Illustrated Through the Way the State and Society 
Perceive Members of the PSG 
Following the requirement articulated in C-A- that the PSG must be “socially 
visible,”185 DHS’s analysis in L.R. asked whether society perceives the PSG as 
a socially distinct group set apart by the members’ shared, immutable 
                                                 
 178. Compare Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 6–15 (describing the abuse of L.R. at the 
hands of her husband, including the increased punishments and threats L.R. received in retaliation 
for her attempts to flee and notify the authorities), with supra note 1 (recounting experiences that 
children have encountered after they resist gang recruitment). 
 179. See DHS Suppemental Brief, supra note 33, at 16. 
 180. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 36. 
 181. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 16. 
 182. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 53; see also supra note 103 and 
accompanying text.  For example, in some Central American countries, relocation is not a 
realistic option because gangs have harnessed recent technological advancements, such as the 
Internet and cellular phones, to extend and intensify their area of influence.  Corsetti, supra note 
12, at 410–11. 
 183. See McGuire, supra note 8, at 3. 
 184. This proposed PSG contains other characteristics that are also immutable.  Nationality 
cannot be changed.  See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.  Although age does change 
with the passage of time, it is still immutable because age can only be changed with time and not 
to avoid persecution.  Cf. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 53 (stating that age 
is immutable). 
 185. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006). 
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characteristic.186  In its brief, DHS indicated that, upon further fact finding, the 
subordinate status of women in domestically violent relationships could be 
considered socially visible in Mexico through a showing that women in these 
relationships are afforded less protection from harm due to their subordinate 
status.187  In her response brief, L.R. asserted that in Mexico, female victims of 
domestic violence are not afforded government protection from abuse 
occurring within their domestic relationships.188  Because of this “base cultural 
acceptance of violence against women,” L.R. concluded that women like 
herself in violent domestic relationships were viewed as a segment not worthy 
of police protection.189  Therefore, L.R.’s immutable characteristic, subordinate 
status in a relationship, marked her as a member of a group that society 
perceived differently from the general population. Because DHS agreed with 
L.R. upon remand and the judge granted asylum, L.R.’s conclusion must have 
successfully established social visibility for her proposed PSG.190 
Children resisting gang recruitment may utilize the same rubric based upon 
distinctions made by the state and the rest of society to prove social visibility.  
In gang-controlled neighborhoods, where violence and criminal activity have 
become the unchallenged norm, those who expressly oppose the gang’s wishes 
are often a recognizable segment of the community.191  Because individuals 
who oppose gangs risk violent retaliation or death,192 those living in  
gang-controlled areas generally comply with gang demands instead of 
jeopardizing the safety of themselves or their loved ones.193  Therefore, 
persons in these societies who resist gang demands are in an identifiable 
minority who “stand out [to and] from the rest of the community.”194 
The minority status of child resistors, coupled with governmental responses 
to gang violence, show a clear distinction between members of this PSG and 
the rest of society.195  The governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras have implemented “zero-tolerance,” or mano dura, policies to deal 
                                                 
 186. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 17–18. 
 187. Id.  This view was illustrated when police refused to rescue L.R. from her “private” 
affairs.  Id. at 17. 
 188. Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 50. 
 189. Id. at 51–52 (quoting DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 18). 
 190. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 191. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 12. 
 192. Id. ¶ 6; see also Corsetti, supra note 12, at 407. 
 193. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 10, 12; see also supra note 12. 
 194. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 11–12 (observing that in contrast 
to “ordinary people” exposed to gang activity, resistors are a “special group” specficially targeted 
by gangs). 
 195. Cf. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 17–18 (explaining the state’s response 
can be considered a reflection of society’s view about the members of a PSG); supra text 
accompanying note 196. 
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with the corruption of gangs.196  These policies, aimed at gang members, 
consist of draconian social-cleansing practices,197 and have led to “the arrest 
and detention of thousands of youth” believed to be gang members.198  
Because children who resist gang recruitment cannot rightly be held as a part 
of this massive detention if they have no gang associations, the state must be 
able to distinguish between children who acquiesce to gang recruitment and 
those who oppose it.199  Therefore, children who oppose gang recruitment are a 
distinct segment of society.  They are socially visible to their neighbors as a 
minority class of youths that do not follow the status quo by acquiescing to 
gang demands.200  They are also recognized as socially distinct by the state as 
children who are not affiliated with gang activity.201 
3.  Ensuring that the PSG Is Sufficiently Particular by Clarifying Amorphous 
Terms 
The final part of DHS’s L.R. analysis focused on whether the proposed PSGs 
were particular enough to “clearly delineate[] who is in the group.”202  
Although asylum claims asserting the proposed PSG “Salvadoran, 
Guatemalan, or Honduran children under the age of twelve who gang members 
in control of their neighborhood expect to acquiesce to gang recruitment,”203 
                                                 
 196. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 8, at 4; see also Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra 
note 10, ¶ 9; supra notes 100–03 (discussing Central American governmental responses to 
gangs).  Mano dura have been referred to as the Central American governments’ “war on gangs.”  
Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 10. 
 197. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 12 (explaining that these mano 
dura policies include “extrajudicial killing, police violence, arbitrary or unlawful arrests and 
detention as well as inhumane prison conditions,” which are directed at those believed to be gang 
members); see also MANZ, supra note 8, at 37 (concluding that these mano dura policies have 
been ineffective in containing violence). 
 198. McGuire, supra note 8, at 4. 
 199. Cf. SEBASTIAN AMAR ET AL., supra note 25, at app.C at 45 (providing examples of 
gang-related tattoos and other distinct gang markings).  Gang members are often recognizable 
within their societies.  For example, in Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of the United 
States, the applicant knew the men who were harassing him were part of the gang Mara 
Salvatrucha because of their tattoos.  502 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Orozco-Polanco, 
No. A75-244-012, 2 (Immigration Ct., El Paso, Tex. Dec. 18, 1997) (“The El Bordo gang 
members cultivate a distinctive appearance, wearing big pants, shaving their heads, and having 
tattoos . . . . The members of [their] rival gang, which is called the Poporopes, dress like cowboys 
and wear seven-inch belt buckles.”). The state relies on such visible indicia, along with other 
signs demonstrating gang association, to differentiate between resistors and gang members and to 
prosecute gang members under mano dura legislation.  See Melissa Siskind, Guilt by Association: 
Transnational Gangs and the Merits of a New Mano Dura, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 289, 
305–05 (2008) (describing the statutory requirements for a group to be recognized and prosecuted 
as a gang). 
 200. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 12.  
 201. See supra note 195. 
 202. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 18–21.  
 203. See supra text accompanying note 163. 
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will still be subject to a case-by-case determination for asylum eligibility, the 
template PSG satisfies the final requirement of particularity.204  
DHS acknowledged in their supplemental brief potential concerns regarding 
the particularity of its proposed PSGs.205  In particular, DHS noted that the 
term “domestic relationship” might be considered amorphous.206  However, 
DHS suggested that this phrase could be defined with sufficient particularity 
by using the definition of “crime of domestic violence” found in U.S. 
immigration law.207   
The seemingly amorphous relationship between a “gang and expected gang 
recruit” is defined in the proposed PSG with just as much particularity.208  The 
expected recruit must be: (1) under twelve years old; (2) living in a  
gang-controlled neighborhood of El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras; and 
(3) expected by gang members to acquiesce to gang recruitment.209  These 
specifications permit clear differentiation between members of the PSG and 
non-members because these elements do not entertain multiple 
interpretations.210  The first two elements are clearly delineable characteristics 
of age and nationality; the third element, although factually subjective and 
requiring judgment as to who gangs expect to recruit, can be particularized 
with the deeper analysis set forth above, explaining precisely the group of 
vulnerable youths expected to join gangs.211 
DHS also addressed overbreadth concerns, noting that the phrase “ability to 
leave a relationship” could be fairly ambiguous and permit multiple 
interpretations; however, DHS explained that applying the standard on a  
case-by-case basis would yield sufficient particularity because each applicant 
would apply the standard to his or her facts.212  This would allow the Board to 
assess with particularity an applicant’s reasonable ability to leave the 
relationship.213   
Applying this portion of the analysis to children resisting gang recruitment, 
members of the proposed PSG have a similar inability to leave their 
                                                 
 204. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (emphasizing the requirement of 
particularity). 
 205. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 19–20. 
 206. Id. at 19.  This is likely because “domestic relationship” can refer to a number of living 
situations in common parlance, including, but not limited to, roommates, married couples, and 
same-sex partners. 
 207. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2006)).  Importantly, DHS intended to use this 
statutory definition as an example of the potential for particularity, and did not intend it to be the 
only way to characterize “domestic relationship.”  Id. 
 208. See supra text accompanying note 163. 
 209. See supra text accompanying note 163. 
 210. Cf. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting a PSG because the court 
found the terms of the PSG could be read to have mutiple meanings). 
 211. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text. 
 212. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 20. 
 213. Id. at 20 & n.14. 
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relationships.214  For those who would argue that the PSG is overbroad, DHS’s 
analysis found that some ambiguity does not trigger automatic rejection of the 
PSG so long as the Board can assess the reasonableness of the applicant’s 
claim with sufficient probability.215  Therefore, the Board should assess each 
child’s asylum claim on its own facts to determine whether the gang’s 
perception of the relationship or the child’s social and economic characteristics 
eliminate any reasonable ability to escape the relationship.216 
Permitting asylum claims asserting this PSG would not flood the United 
States with applications because the PSG is not overly broad.  The proposed 
PSG actually has narrow parameters, as it does not establish asylum for every 
child under twelve, nor does it establish asylum for every one of the gangs’ 
recruits.  Only children that resist recruitment face the requisite persecution for 
membership in this PSG.217  Because many youths give in to gang recruitment, 
those who resist are likely to be few in number.218  Hence, children who seek 
asylum under this PSG are a sufficiently particular, discrete class. 
B.  Alleviating Residual Issues Concerning the Construction of the Proposed 
PSG 
Although the requisites of immutability, social visibility, and sufficient 
particularity may be satisfied using the rationale outlined in DHS’s L.R. 
brief,219 other concerns not covered in DHS’s brief warrant a short discussion.  
First, Lukwago v. Ashcroft requires that the PSG exist independently from 
the claimed persecution.220  Accordingly, regardless of whether the gangs harm 
them, members of the PSG proposed in this Note will remain anticipated gang 
recruits by virtue of their vulnerable age, economic situation, and habitation in 
                                                 
 214. See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text (explaining children’s inability to leave 
the relationship because of the gangs’ persistance and environmental constraints). 
 215. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 20. 
 216. See id. at 16–20. 
 217. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 6, 11–12 (explaining that 
refusing to give in to gang demands is what causes violent retaliation, and that those who resist 
recruitment are targeted with such responses); see also supra Part I.A (defining the requisite 
persecution for refugee status).  Only those who face persecution are eligible to apply for asylum.  
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2006). 
 218. See supra note 8 (providing information on the large number of gang members relative 
to the rest of the population); see also Corsetti, supra note 12, at 413–14 (describing the 
incentives for youths to join gangs, including the lack of incentives not to do so).  For example, 
the children of Honduras are generally “unemployed youth[s] who are not in school” and are 
“unable to develop the skills required for attending a university or obtaining skilled employment 
[thus] they provide a ready pool of gang recruits.  In the absence of familial and community 
support, many marginalized youth[s] have turned to gangs for social support, a source of 
livelihood, and protection.”  SEELKE, supra note 8, at 6–7 (footnote omitted). 
 219. See supra Part III.A.1–3. 
 220. 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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gang-controlled neighborhoods;221 thus, the PSG exists independent of the 
gang’s persecution. 
Additionally, the Board explained in S-E-G- that applicants who resist gang 
recruitment do not constitute a PSG because they do not face harm anymore 
severe than the harm faced by anyone else who defies a gang’s demands.222  
However, this rationale stands in stark contrast to the guidance given by the 
UNHCR.223  To establish eligibility for asylum, “it is not necessary for 
[members of] a group to be victim[s] of a higher incidence of crime or human 
rights violations than the rest of the population.”224  To say that these children 
are not entitled to establish asylum eligibility just because their persecutors 
also harm others for different reasons225 is to wrongfully ignore reasonable 
asylum claims from children who may legitimately need protection using the 
proposed PSG.226    
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While controlling poverty-stricken urban neighborhoods through violence 
and extortion, gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras forcibly recruit 
children under the age of twelve to fill the lowest echelon of their ranks.  
Children who resist forced recruitment are targeted for violent  
retaliation—sometimes resulting in death.  Because the Board’s decisions in  
S-E-G- and E-A-G- held that children who resist gang recruitment do not have 
a recognized basis for asylum, the United States has not been able to offer 
these children protection. 
The PSG proposed in this Note—“Salvadoran, Guatemalan, or Honduran 
children under the age of twelve who are expected by gang members in control 
of their neighborhoods to acquiesce to gang recruitment”—provides sound 
means for these children to establish asylum eligibility.  Following the logic set 
forth by the DHS in its supplemental brief in the matter of L.R., this PSG 
identifies an immutable characteristic, proves social visibility, and is 
sufficiently particular to establish eligibility for asylum. 
                                                 
 221. See supra notes 91–92, 178 and accompanying text. 
 222. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 587 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 223. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 35; see also supra notes 121–22 
and accompanying text. 
 224. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 35. 
 225. Gang members harm child resistors on account of their membership in the proposed 
PSG, which should make them eligible for asylum.  See supra Part III.A.1–3.  However, gang 
members also persecute other members of society for various reasons.  See Guidance Note on 
Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶12 (giving examples of ways that gangs target various members 
of society).  While the determination of whether the other harms inflicted by gangs are on account 
of a protected ground falls outside the scope of this Note, the fact that gangs harm others for other 
reasons should have no impact on determining the viability of this PSG. 
 226. Cf. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 22 (explaining that the type of 
violence which is targeted specifically at children who resist gang recruitment violates a number 
of human rights, and would normally be considered persecution for the purposes of asylum). 
